A Moscow Perspective on Ukraine's Election

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/10/27/008.html

Wednesday, October 27, 2004. Page 11.

A Moscow Perspective on Ukraine's Election

By Sergei Markov The possibility of widespread unrest in Ukraine is a real threat as the presidential election approaches. Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, whose rating at the beginning of the campaign was just one-sixth of opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko's, is now running neck and neck with Yushchenko.

Yanukovych's jump in the ratings has been helped by: economic growth in Ukraine, which is running at 13 percent in 2004 -- the highest in Europe; the prime minister's decision to increase pensions twofold; his statement that he will push for Russian to be given the status of an official state language and for an agreement with Russia on dual citizenship; pro-Yanukovych coverage on state-controlled Ukrainian television; a vigorous election campaign; and the fact that significantly more voters live in the industrial, Russian-speaking East and South than in the agricultural West.

In addition, the pro-Russian left will almost certainly support Yanukovych in the event of a runoff.

The opposition, which had been certain of Yushchenko's victory, has suddenly realized that their victory is slipping away from them. This makes it all the more likely that political developments in Ukraine could take a violent turn.

A coup has occurred in Yushchenko's campaign headquarters: The moderates have been pushed aside, while the "Iron Lady" of Ukrainian politics, Yulia Timoshenko, has taken charge. Timoshenko, who has spent time in prison, is the main organizer of mass demonstrations under the slogan "Down With Kuchma!" that have taken place over the past few months; she has many times declared that Ukraine needs to organize a "kashtanovaya" or "chestnut" revolution" (from the word for chestnut trees, kashtani, which line the main Kreshchatik Street in Kiev), similar to the Rose Revolution in Tbilisi, Georgia. The opposition has announced that it intends to gather half a million people for a political rally during election night, Oct. 31, in the center of Kiev with the goal of monitoring the vote count.

On Yanukovych's side, a large Orthodox Christian procession against Yushchenko is planned for the morning of election day. The Ukrainian authorities are also planning a military parade in Kiev on Oct. 28. Moreover, Ukraine's "power-wielding" ministries have issued several public warnings about a possible coup d'etat.

The Yushchenko opposition has developed an ideological justification for launching a revolution: Since Yushchenko has always led in the polls, a truly free and fair election could only produce a Yushchenko victory. If Yushchenko does not win the election, it means that the authorities have falsified the elections. Thus, according to Yushchenko's supporters, the falsification of the election would give the Ukrainian people the moral right to protest and overthrow the regime.

The tension in the election campaign has been ratcheted up even further because of the bizarre illness suffered by Yushchenko, which his supporters believe is the result of an attempt by opponents to poison him. Whatever happens, few believe that Kuchma is prepared to leave office irrespective of the outcome.

Both sides have readied their troops for battle. Yushchenko has on his side the support of:

The activists of Timoshenko's bloc who have organized the mass protests against Kuchma;

Ukrainian nationalist organizations;

The military wing of Mendzhliss, the powerful political organization of Crimean Tatars, which has blockaded Crimean administrative buildings and roads, seized land, rescued by force its members held under arrest and declared unconditional support for Yushchenko;

The student activist group "PORA!." PORA! was organized several months ago along the lines of the OTPOR group in Belgrade which overthrew Slobodan Milosevich, and KMAR in Tbilisi which overthrew Eduard Shevardnadze (Alexander Marich, the main political consultant to OTPOR and KMAR, worked for several months in Kiev; on Oct. 12, he was arrested by the Ukrainian security services and deported);

Activists of the Greek Catholic and Orthodox (Kiev Patriarchate) communities, who several years ago were involved in street battles around churches.

Yanukovych has on his side the support of:

The coal miners, who several months ago disrupted Yushchenko's planned party congress in Donetsk -- effectively expelling Yushchenko from Donetsk. The coal miners would be more than happy to descend on Kiev to "beat the Western Ukrainian nationalists";

The powerful movement of fans of the Shakhtyor and Dynamo soccer teams, controlled by the Yanukovych camp. They have organized outings to various cities in groups numbering as much 30,000;

Activists of the Orthodox organizations representing the Moscow Patriarchate, who have participated in the street battles around churches;

Fighters from the Bratstvo organization, led by Dmitry Korchinsky -- something similar to Eduard Limonov's National Bolshevik Party.

The police, the security services and the army will be on the side of the authorities, but the majority of citizens in Kiev will be on the side of the Yushchenko opposition. Although Yanukovych and Yushchenko are level-pegging nationally, in Kiev, Yushchenko's rating is higher than Yanukovych's by a ratio of 2 to 1. In this context, it is worth recalling Lenin's dictum that in a revolution, having the support of the capital is much more important than having the support of the country as a whole.

The possibility of street clashes in Kiev on election night or shortly after the election is becoming increasingly likely as election day approaches. Indeed, there is no point in talking about whether there will be violent clashes or not, but rather about what can be done to avert them. I believe concerted efforts must be undertaken by the leaders of Russia, the United States and the leading EU countries, who should issue a joint declaration on Ukraine, urging Ukraine's hotheaded politicians to allow the voters -- not the demonstrators -- to ultimately determine who will be the next president of Ukraine. Urgent Russian-European consultations are required, and measures should be taken to prevent the occurrence of political violence in Kiev and disruption of the elections.

Moscow has an interest in Yanukovych winning, but not at the cost of serious destabilization of its neighbor, with which Russia enjoys extensive ties and an almost open border. Paradoxical as it may sound, Moscow has a strong interest in democracy prevailing in the Ukraine. The thing is, approximately 80 percent of Ukrainian citizens believe that Ukrainian-Russian relations should be a priority for the country. Thus, the more democratic Ukraine becomes, the greater the likelihood that Ukrainians' views will become official government policy.

Moscow does not consider Yushchenko a democrat because on issues that are of fundamental importance to Russia -- such as the status of the Russian language, Ukrainian-Russian relations, Ukrainian-U.S. relations and religious-political issues -- his views are in the minority and, if elected, he will most probably foist his views on the majority. The majority of Ukrainians like Yushchenko on a personal level, but do not approve of the political program that his team has prepared for him.

Moscow fears that under Yushchenko, Ukraine's military industrial complex will will be paid a visit by the U.S. intelligence services, as a result of which Russia will be forced to cease military cooperation with the Ukraine. The cost of this could be as much as $10 billion, as well as the possible collapse of the part of Russia's military industrial complex that since Soviet times has been technologically integrated with its Ukrainian counterpart.

Moscow also fears that under Yushchenko, the Russian Black Sea Fleet will be forced out of Sevastopol. The cost of building a new Black Sea Russian naval base is hard to calculate, but we are talking about tens of billions of dollars, as well as the collapse of Russian influence in the Middle East and Mediterranean.

In any case, Moscow is certain that the pro-Russian candidate will always be victorious in any democratic election.

It is a mistake to believe that the political-cultural divide in Ukraine runs between Russians and Ukrainians. In fact, the real cultural and civilizational boundary, as Samuel Huntington shows in "The Clash of Civilizations," is drawn between: Western Ukraine, which is Greek Catholic and which formerly was part of Poland and the Austro-Hungarian Empire (accounting for 15 percent of the population), and Westernized Kievans (approximately 5 percent of the population) on the one side; and, on the other side, the rest of Ukraine, where the traditional Orthodox Russian-Ukrainian majority lives that, incidentally, does not speak literary Russian or literary Ukrainian, but a mixture of the two -- so-called Surzhik.

Thus, Yushchenko is the candidate of the diaspora, while Yanukovych is the "Surzhik" candidate.

Yushchenko represents agricultural, pre-industrial Ukraine, as well as post-industrial Kiev. He also represents the Ukrainian yearning for an identity separate from Russia, as well as the younger generation's dream of Ukraine becoming a full-fledged member of Europe.

Yanukovych, on the other hand, represents the Russian-Ukrainian Orthodox majority, working in the industrial and manufacturing centers of Ukraine. He also represents the pensioners, who actively participate in Ukrainian elections and who, at the end of the day, will most likely play a decisive role in bringing Yanukovych to power as Ukraine's next president.

Sergei Markov is director of the Institute of Political Studies and head of the analytical department of the Russian Club in Ukraine. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.