Ukraine and Europe: A shotgun wedding is bound to fail

Anatol Lieven International Herald Tribune
Tuesday, December 21, 2004
http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/12/20/opinion/edlieven.html

WASHINGTON There is a right reason and a wrong reason for the West to support the camp of the presidential challenger Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine, just as there is a right way and a wrong way to set about integrating Ukraine into the West.

The right reason for supporting Yushchenko and the mass movement that has gathered behind his candidacy is that these people are protesting not only a blatantly rigged election but also a thoroughly rotten regime. Quite apart from the rigging and the apparent assassination attempt against Yushchenko, the personal history of the officially backed candidate for president, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, makes him quite unfit for senior office in Ukraine or any other decent state. This is also why the West must oppose Russian pressure in support of Yanukovich.

The wrong reason to support Yushchenko and his followers is out of a desire to continue the cold war, "roll back" Russian influence, and turn Ukraine into a Western buffer state against Russia. This is wrong because close ties to Russia are cherished not only by the 10 million ethnic Russians in Ukraine, but also by very many ethnic Ukrainians - insofar as one can distinguish between the two, since across large parts of the south and east of Ukraine, Russians and Ukrainians speak the same language, share the same culture and are thoroughly intermarried.

Even if a majority of Ukrainians decides that it wishes to end the special relationship with Russia, this is a decision which any wise Ukrainian government will have to approach with great care. We have learned from the recent history of the Balkans, the Caucasus and other parts of the world that in deeply divided societies, the fate of states cannot and should not simply be decided by numerical majorities. Careful national consensus-building is also essential, even if this takes a long time.

Many Ukrainians are attached to Russia not only because of shared culture and history, but also because economic ties between Ukraine and Russia considerably outweigh those between Ukraine and the West. Millions of Ukrainians work legally in Russia and send back vitally important remittances, while only a handful are allowed to work legally in the West.

There is also a right way and a wrong way to promote Ukraine's integration with the West. The right way is through the European Union, as part of a transformation of both Ukraine and the EU itself over the next generation.

This process is appropriate because it is organic. As economies, societies and political systems develop in a West European direction and away from their Communist past, so they naturally draw closer to membership of the EU. But this is not a one-way process. If the EU succeeds in admitting Turkey and the Balkan countries over the next 15 years, it will be impossible to deny membership to a reformed Ukraine. But if the EU does admit these states, then it will be fundamentally transformed as an institution.

The EU may have to become a much looser grouping, in which eastern and southern members are no longer so sharply divided from non-EU states. This in turn would permit the forging of a new relationship between the EU and Russia that would diminish Russian fears of being essentially expelled from Europe by EU expansion.

The wrong way to try to integrate Ukraine with the West is through early membership of NATO. Such a move would infuriate and terrify Russia, and risk a severe Russian reaction. And if NATO membership long preceded Ukraine's actual economic and social integration into the West, then the close ties between Russia and Ukraine, and the strong support of many Ukrainians, could give Moscow dangerous opportunities to make its anger felt.

Those who warn of such a reaction from Moscow are often accused of crying wolf, given Russia's failure to react against NATO membership for the Baltic states. But Ukraine is much more important to Russia from every point of view. And there is also a famous proverb about camels and last straws.

Taking Ukraine into NATO long before it is ready to join the EU would fail a basic test of realpolitik. Rather than a strong and stable buffer state, the West would acquire a weak and divided one - in other words, no true buffer state at all. That could be a recipe for disaster if, at any point in the future, America's military commitment to Europe were to falter.

(Anatol Lieven is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His latest book is ‘‘America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism.’’)