The Lessons of Ukraine: Russia's Growing Influence in Eurasia

by Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.
Executive Memorandum #949
November 12, 2004

The outcome of the Ukrainian presidential elections could dramatically
increase Moscow's influence in Eurasia. If former Prime Minister Victor
Yanukovich (the Kremlin's preferred candidate) is elected, the Kremlin would
virtually control the Ukrainian presidency. That would allow Russia to
exercise greater geopolitical influence in Ukraine and would increase
Moscow's political momentum in the rest of Eurasia.

The biggest challenges for the U.S. are to keep Russia in the anti-terrorism
coalition and to ensure continued access to Russian energy resources, while
supporting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all post-Soviet
states. To these ends, the U.S. should boost cooperation with these
countries and expand the dialogue with Moscow about contentious issues, such
as South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the U.S. presence in Central Asia. In
Ukraine, the Bush Administration should assist Ukrainian groups that are
committed to democracy, free markets, and Euro-Atlantic integration by
providing diplomatic, financial, and media support.
The First Round

According to the government-controlled Central Electoral Commission,
Yanukovich received 40.12 percent of the vote in the first round of the
presidential election. Opposition leader Victor Yushchenko received 39.15
percent. However, European observers and independent pollsters gave the
victory to Yushchenko by 4 percent to 6 percent. Widespread election fraud
and Yushchenko's lack of access to the government-controlled media could
also give Yanukovich a "win" in the run-off election on November 21.

The U.S. has a strategic interest in preserving Ukraine's sovereignty and
keeping the democratic process on track, while preventing Russian influence
from growing further. The U.S. has warned that it may impose selective visa
bans on Ukrainian officials involved in election fraud, but this may not
prevent fraud in the run-off.

Russia's Ascendancy

The Soviet-educated Russian elite, which generally views the U.S. as a
strategic adversary, may challenge the sovereignty of or pursue increased
control over the post-Soviet states by overtly supporting pro-Moscow
candidates. In the process, undermine long-term U.S. interests in developing
democratic, globally integrated states in Eurasia.

There are two reasons for the Kremlin's ascendancy in Ukraine. First,
according to published accounts in Moscow and Kiev, the Kremlin has poured
unprecedented resources into the election campaign--at least $200 million
from sympathetic Russian and Ukrainian businessmen. Second, Russia has
access to the Soviet-era criminal files of Yanukovich, who was jailed twice
for aggravated assault and robbery. According to Moscow experts,
Yanukovich's criminal past creates a relationship of a case officer and an
"asset" between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Yanukovich.

Ukraine's Significance

Ukraine should be viewed in the larger context of the recent negative
regional dynamics. Before the elections, at Moscow's request, President
Leonid Kuchma and Yanukovich engineered changes in Ukraine's military
doctrine and turned away from NATO and EU integration. On October 17,
Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenka pulled off an unconstitutional
power grab in Belarus. The stalemate in Moldova about the secessionist
Transdniestr region continues. In the Caucasus, Moscow is undermining
Georgian independence by creeping annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Ukraine is crucial to the Kremlin because it is a large-scale demonstration
that Russia can reestablish influence in the former empire and expand its
access to the Black Sea and Southeastern Europe, including the Balkans.
Russia has deliberately focused on detaching Ukraine from its Western ties
and making it dependent on Moscow.

Implications for Eurasia

If Russia successfully consolidates control over Belarus and Ukraine while
derailing a peaceful resolution in Moldova, Moscow may also be encouraged to
pursue greater control over Caspian oil. It could do so by increasing
pressure on Kazakhstan, possibly through its Russian-speaking minority, and
it could eventually move to secure Azerbaijan's compliance with the Kremlin
regional policy.

Moscow has also utilized secessionist enclaves to advance its "near abroad"
policy. Beyond that, it may further undermine pro-American Georgian
President Mikheil Saakashvili and pressure Uzbekistan to return to the
Russia-led bloc. However, as the Beslan tragedy demonstrated, Russian
military power is still limited in its ability to counter real security
threats. Such ambitious policy may stoke imperial hubris in Russia--with
unpredictable consequences.

What the Bush Administration Should Do

The biggest U.S. challenges are to keep Russia in the anti-terrorism
coalition and to ensure access to Russian energy resources, while keeping
the former Soviet republics sovereign and independent. Furthermore, the
tools in the U.S. diplomatic toolbox are limited. Russia is flush with oil
revenue and no longer needs Western economic assistance, and it can easily
obtain the financing and needed advanced technology for oil exploration on
the open market. In this context, the Bush Administration should:

Support Ukrainian groups that are committed to democracy, free markets, and
Euro-Atlantic integration by providing diplomatic, financial, and media
support.
Support sovereignty and territorial integrity of all post-Soviet states by
expanding cooperation via NATO's Partnership for Peace, bilateral
military-to-military ties, exchanges, train-and-equip programs, and even
limited troop deployment where necessary.
Expand high-level diplomatic dialogue with Moscow about contentious issues,
such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the U.S. presence in Central Asia.

Conclusions

Recent developments in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East will require
the President's attention and will likely limit American freedom of maneuver
in Eurasia. The muted U.S. responses to recent power shifts in Ukraine and
Belarus demonstrate that the U.S. is unwilling to challenge Moscow's growing
influence. However, the long-term geopolitical outcome in Eurasia will
depend on Washington's engagement in the region, on Russia and the U.S
agreeing on the "traffic rules" in Eurasia, and on Moscow abandoning its
anti-American policy in and beyond the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies in
the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at
The Heritage Foundation.