Big Brother and 'Little Russians'

The very notion that Ukraine would turn into a Western outpost on Russia's southern flank is a nightmare for Russia's ruling elite

By Richard Pipes
Newsweek International


Dec. 6 issue - The dramatic events unfolding since Ukraine's presidential election can be understood only by taking into account both Russia's imperial ambitions and its neighbor's split identity. Russians have always been inordinately proud of their country's size. In the 17th century they would boast to foreign visitors that Russia was larger than the surface of the visible moon. In their language, velikii means both "large" and "great," so that by a mental sleight they have come to believe that entitles them to the status of a Great Power.

The collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet empire profoundly affected the psyche of Russians. They simply cannot adjust to the fact that they have been so much reduced in size and influence. According to public-opinion polls, three-quarters of Russians regret the passing of the Soviet Union: much of this nostalgia derives from the feeling that the loss of the Soviet empire has turned them into a minor power, which other nations neither respect nor fear. To deal with this problem, the government of President Vladimir Putin has quietly but steadfastly sought to restore Moscow's influence over what had once been the Soviet republics and now are sovereign states.

Various devices have been employed to this end, including economic pressure and the refusal to withdraw Russian troops from such places as the Ukrainian city of Sevastopol, home port to Russia's Black Sea fleet. Such methods have led to great tension in some neighboring regions, notably Georgia, where Moscow has been intervening in blatant disregard of that republic's sovereign rights.

No loss has been more painfully felt than that of Ukraine. This is not only because Ukraine is the richest and most populous of the lost dependencies. It is also because Ukraine had been the cradle of Russian statehood, for it is here, in Kiev, a thousand years ago, that its first government was formed. The "Little Russians," as Russians traditionally called Ukrainians, are considered brothers, and their separation into an independent state is seen as betrayal. But the present conflict has yet another dimension. Viktor Yushchenko, the popular candidate for the presidency whom the authorities have declared the loser, is openly pro-Western, and some of his supporters have incautiously predicted that under his administration, Ukraine might apply for membership in NATO.

This prospect is intolerable to Moscow, which has gone as far as it can in reconciling itself to NATO's presence along its European border. The very notion that Ukraine would turn into a Western outpost on Russia's southern flank is a nightmare for Russia's ruling elite. The Ukrainian republic consists of two regions with very different cultures and ethnic structures. The western, agricultural half lived for centuries under Polish and Austrian rule, enjoying close contacts with Europe. It is the center of Ukrainian nationalism as well as libertarian traditions.

The eastern half, Ukraine's industrial heartland, has a large Russian minority whose attitude toward Ukrainian nationhood is rather ambivalent. In his endeavor to bring Ukraine into closer dependence on Russia, Putin has relied on the Russian elements, as well as on the bureaucratic apparatus, a holdover from Soviet days, which by its upbringing and self-interest feels an instinctive hostility to democracy.

In the recent presidential elections, the prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych, was the favorite of Moscow as well as the Ukrainian bureaucracy, the Russian minority and the industrial magnates who had made their fortunes cooperating with the pro-Moscow establishment. His rival, Yushchenko, represented the democratic and pro-European strivings of the Ukrainian majority. The bureaucracy, determined to stay in power, blatantly rigged the election in Yanukovych's favor. Putin's unseemly congratulations to Yanukovych before the election results were even fully tabulated was a departure from his customary caution and an indication of the importance he attaches to preventing Ukraine's westward drift.

The gross violation of democratic procedures has set off popular demonstrations on a scale never before seen in any former Soviet republic and quite unthinkable in Russia, whose population is more docile and more willing to acquiesce in whatever it is that its rulers want. Two scenarios seem likely. One leads to a bloody confrontation between the outraged Ukrainian population at large and the pro-Russian elements in and out of government, a confrontation that could escalate to a full-scale civil war. The other, much more sensible outcome is a compromise in the form of a recount of the vote or even fresh elections.

The road taken depends a great deal on the West. If the United States and Europe continue to exert pressure on both Moscow and Kiev, the chances are that a peaceful resolution will be found, since neither the Russian government nor its allies in Ukraine can afford to alienate the Western democracies. But if the pressure weakens, out of an ill-advised effort to placate Moscow, Putin and his Kievan friends will be able to consummate their coup d'?tat. The result may be the breakup of Ukraine and the disappearance of an important barrier to Russia's further imperial ambitions.

Pipes is professor emeritus of Russian history at Harvard. His latest book is titled "Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger" (Yale University Press).

© 2004 Newsweek, Inc.
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