Putin's Ukrainian Misadventure

By Zbigniew Brzezinski
1,129 words
1 December 2004
The Wall Street Journal Europe
A6
English

While it is premature to predict the outcome of the ongoing Ukrainian crisis, it is not too early to assess the stakes involved, to identify its initial losers and winners, and to reflect on its broader policy implications for the U.S. and the European Union.

The stakes are enormous and they go far beyond the issue of democracy in Ukraine itself. Although Ukraine has been plagued by corruption and abuse of power, which have eroded its initially impressive democracy, the country still did hold -- unlike Russia -- two genuinely free presidential elections. And again, unlike Russia's conduct in Chechnya, it dealt with Crimean separatism in a civilized and restrained fashion. A truly democratic Ukraine would give an enormous boost to the prospects for democracy in the rest of the former Soviet Union.

That is why the KGB-dominated elite that is today ensconced in the Kremlin is so hostile to a genuine democracy in Ukraine. A democratic Ukraine would not be anti-Russian; but it would inevitably generate strong pressures for a democratic revival in Russia. With real democracy in Ukraine, more and more Russians would view the Putin regime as an anachronism. It is symbolic that some of Russia's more daring democratic leaders have appeared at rallies in Kiev on behalf of Viktor Yushchenko, whose electoral victory the Ukrainian oligarchs as well as Vladimir Putin have been attempting to erase.

By the same token, however, the defeat of democracy in Ukraine or a successful Russian-backed breakup of the country would further ignite the ambitions of those in Moscow who still dream of a reconstituted empire. With Ukraine transformed into a satellite like Belarus, the Kremlin would again be an imperial capital. That, indeed, would be a tragic setback for those in Russia who have recognized -- as Boris Yeltsin did more than a decade ago in a speech delivered in Kiev -- that to be a hated imperial power is not a blessing but a historic curse.

While the final outcome of the political contest in Ukraine is still uncertain, it is already evident that Viktor Yanukovych, the preferred candidate of the oligarchs and personally endorsed by Mr. Putin, is the loser. His electoral "victory" has been totally discredited, while his support for the separatist threat in eastern Ukraine has disqualified him as a Ukrainian prime minister. His remaining hope is to become in effect the Ukrainian equivalent of Alexander Lukashenko, the Kremlin-sponsored satrap in neighboring Belarus, a prospect that even many supporters of Mr. Yanukovych would find quite unappealing.

The second loser is President Putin of Russia. He has not only identified himself personally with a brazen effort to subvert the democratic process in Ukraine; he has also made himself the object of ridicule by dashing off two premature congratulatory messages to Mr. Yanukovych, even while professing support for a fair compromise to the contested elections.

As yet, there are no final "winners". However, though not yet a winner, Viktor Yushchenko is obviously the man of the hour and the person in whom a majority of Ukrainians are investing their political hopes. In some respects, outgoing President Leonid Kuchma is also a partial winner because at the moment he is viewed as the necessary source of political continuity and the possible sponsor of a contrived compromise. That gives him a new lease on life. It also confronts him with an opportunity to redeem his image and to gain both political and financial security for his family if he steps down in a manner that provides for a peaceful transfer of power to Mr. Yushchenko. The necessary first step is for Mr. Kuchma to dismiss the discredited Mr. Yanukovych as prime minister and appoint a genuinely neutral personality to supervise the state administration during the electoral process.

In the unfolding circumstances, the position of the West should be principled and unambiguous regarding the long-term consequences of alternative outcomes. While no serious person in the West wishes relations with Russia to deteriorate, the Kremlin should not be blind to its own interest in good relations with the West. The Kremlin cannot masquerade as a democracy while complicit in squashing democracy.

Moreover, both the U.S. and the EU should make it clear that support for separatism in Ukraine as a means for defeating democracy is an unacceptable form of international blackmail. Such separatism also plays with fire. Russia cannot be demanding support for its suppression of separatism in Chechnya while sponsoring breakaways in Ukraine, in addition to persistently doing so in Georgia. An outbreak of violence in the sensitive regions of eastern Ukraine could prove contagious in the non-Russian regions of Russia itself.

It is also necessary to press Mr. Kuchma to eschew new electoral tricks. There has already been some talk in his camp that in any new elections only new candidates would be permitted to run, or that a new candidate would be put up against Mr. Yushchenko. In either case, Mr. Yushchenko -- already having been deprived of victory by massive fraud -- would be disadvantaged. Both the U.S. and the EU should be firm on this issue as well and not let themselves be bamboozled. The choice is clear: Either Mr. Yushchenko is declared the real winner in the recent elections, or the elections are re-run.

As soon as new elections are scheduled, the U.S. and the EU should again engage themselves, even more and earlier than before, in closely monitoring the electoral process. A renewed effort and even greater vigilance are needed to make certain that the Ukrainians this time round have the opportunity to make their own choice. Free choice was denied to them in the recent elections, and it must be respected in any rescheduled vote. It is particularly important that Ukrainian TV no longer be the mouthpiece of the ruling oligarchs. A formal U.N. supervisory presence might also be contrived, especially if the Ukrainian government itself was to invite U.N. observers.

Given the stakes involved, the leaders of the Western democracies should also articulate a more defined vision of the West's longer-range relationship with a democratic Ukraine and -- one hopes soon -- a democratic Russia. Any genuinely democratic neighbor of the EU should tangibly benefit from such proximity even if not yet ready itself for consideration for membership. A larger and more flexible framework of transcontinental cooperation that reaches beyond a "Europe to the Urals" (once so prophetically evoked by de Gaulle) is urgently needed to give the Ukrainian as well as Russian peoples a socially attractive point of historical destination.